An interesting judgment has been delivered by the Supreme Court recently in Sharma Transport v. State of Maharashtra through a special leave where six appeals and three writ peitions were jointly taken up by the Court. The main issue in the petition was whether transporters are allowed to put up the luggage on the roof of a tourist vehicle. Court decided the issue with reference to the appeal filed by Sharma Transport. Reference had been made to Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ( hereinafter “Rules”) along with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was contended by the petitioner that they had a right to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of the vehicle, and if not allowed to do so, their right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution would be violated. It was contended by the state that as it is clearly mentioned in t Rule 128 (9) of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 that the transporters should provide space for the luggage of the passengers at the rear and the sides of the vehicle, and prohibits carrying the luggage on the roof of the vehicle. Petition filed by the appellant was rejected by the Bombay High Court primarily on the ground that:
“We are not accepting the submission of the petitioner that in the absence of a specific restriction in regard to having luggage holds/carrier on the roof of the vehicle the petitioners cannot be prevented from carrying the goods/luggage on the roof of the vehicle. On the contrary we are of the clear view that luggage has to be stored at the places specifically permitted by sub rule 9(i) viz., at the rear or at sides or both, but not the roof of the vehicle.”
It was contended by the learned counsel for the state that carrying luggage on the roof of a tourist vehicles increases the chances of accident, and which consequently lead to the danger which passengers have to bear. A specific limit on the luggage to be carried by the passengers has been provided under the Rules, and transporters are legally bound to follow such limit. Section 2 (43) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines the meaning of the expression `tourist vehicle' to mean a contract carriage, constructed or adapted and equipped and maintained in accordance with such specifications as may be prescribed in this behalf. Counsel for the appellant argued by relying on the Rule 93 of the Rules and thereby incorporating it with Rule 128 (9) which mentions the places where luggage are to be kept in. But, their contention was evidently rejected by the court principally on the ground that that rule specified “tractors/articulated vehicle” and it cannot in any manner be related to the tourist vehicle, which was in dispute in the present case. Rule 128(9) of the Rules states
(9) Luggage.--(i) Luggage holds shall be provided at the rear or at the sides, or both, of the tourist vehicle with sufficient space and size, and shall be rattle proof, dustproof and waterproof with safety arrangements;
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while pronouncing that –
Rule 128 (9) is a special provision meant for laying down specifications for a tourist vehicle. The sub-Rule specifically provides that in a tourist vehicle, the permit holder should only provide luggage holds at the rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist vehicle with sufficient space and size. When the Rules specifically make a provision in regard to the place where luggage holds shall be provided by necessary implication, it goes to exclude all the other places of the tourist vehicle for being used as luggage holds. In our view, since the language of the Rule is clear and unambiguous, no other construction need be resorted to understand the plain language of the sub-Rule (a) of Rule 128 of the Rules. Rule 128 is a special provision for tourist vehicles which excludes General Rule 93 to the extent of conflict between the former and the later.
In addition to this, certain case laws had been discussed by the Court to make it clear and unambiguous that when the plain and simple reading of a statue is able to signify the intention of the legislature, then there is no need to make it more complicated by resorting to assumptions which are not required.
Case Laws on the Interpretation of Statues –
In this case – Sharma Transport v. State of Maharashtra
“The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the Statute gives a different indication of such meaning and is likely to lead to absurd result, in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. When the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to give effect to it.”
Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297
“10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided...”
Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111
“24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law.
25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”
Harshad S. Mehta v. State of Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 257
“34. There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction, that construction is to be adopted whatever be its effect...”
Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273
“9...It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act...”
Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh,(2001) 3 SCC 594
“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of construction but it is not open to first create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the same by taking recourse to some general principle.”
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