Sunday, August 28, 2011

Why Copyright Cannot be Claimed on Broadcasting - A brief Overview


This post is meant to explain basic principle as regards why copyright cannot be claimed for broadcasting. Copyright, as provided in Black’s Law Dictionary, can be defined as a right granted by the statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic production, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them. In India, matters relating to copyright are governed by Copyright Act, 1957. Section 13 of the Act brings into notice the works on which copyright can be claimed and it can be read as –

“13. Works in which copyright subsists.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this section and the other provisions of this Act, copyright shall subsist throughout India in the following classes of works, that is to say,-

(a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works;

(b) cinematograph films; and

(c) [sound recordings;]”

Further Section 14 of the Act defines “Copyright”. Broadcasting as general does not find itself placed under this Section and it has separately been dealt under Section 37 under the head Broadcast Reproduction Right. It will not be difficult to assume that Section 14 does not provide any protection to broadcasting right and the same can be framed out from the State of Objects and Reasons of the Copyright Act, 1957 which states that

(11) Certain rights akin to copyright are conferred on broadcasting authorities in respect of programmes broadcast by them.


It clearly indicates that certain rights similar to that of copyright are conferred on broadcasting authorities but not copyright itself. Section 37 was inserted by means of an amendment to the act in the year 1994 which included the right to be conferred on broadcasting authorities and further it provides a list where broadcasting right can said to be infringed as distinct from copyright infringement. Leading case in the relation is ESPN Star Sports v. Global Broadcast News Ltd. & Ors., decided by Delhi High Court in the year 2008. It specifically deals with the issue regarding the distinction between Copyright and Broadcasting rights in detail. Further this issue was discussed in Uruguay round of the WTO Agreement of Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement) in 1994. In addition to this, issue as regards satellite broadcasting has specifically been dealt in cases Raj Video Vision v. M/s Sun TV, 1994 (2), Madras Law Weekly 158, AA Associates v. Prem Goel AIR 2002 Del 142. M/s Video Master v. M/s Nishi Productions, 1998 (18) PTC 117. It can be said that Section 13 and 14 of the Copyright Act does not cover broadcasting rights and copyright cannot be claimed for broadcasting, rather broadcasting rights can be claimed. Further if broadcast work is recorded in some material form, then copyright can surely be claimed for it. Further chapters dealing with remedies for copyright and broadcasting rights are distinct from each other. The relevant portion of the Uruguay Round states that –

“Broadcasting organizations shall have the right to prohibit the following acts when undertaken without their authorization: the fixation, the reproduction of fixations, and the rebroadcasting by wireless means of broadcasts, as well as the communication to the public of television broadcasts of the same. Where Members do not grant such rights to broadcasting organizations, they shall provide owners of copyright in the subject matter of broadcasts with the possibility of preventing the above acts, subject to the provisions of the Berne Convention (1971).”

Further Section 2 (dd) of the Copyright Act defines the term broadcast

“2(dd) “broadcast” means communication to the public -(i) by any means of wireless diffusion, whether in any one or more of the forms of signs, sounds or visual images; or

(ii) by wire, and includes a re-broadcast;”

Section 37 (3) provides the acts where broadcasting right can said to be infringement and it can be read as

“(3) During the continuance of a broadcast reproduction right in relation to any broadcast, any person who, without the license of the owner of the right does any of the following acts of the broadcast or any substantial part thereof-

(a) re-broadcasts the broadcast; or

(b) causes the broadcast to be heard or seen by the public on payment of any charges; or

(c) makes any sound recording or visual recording of the broadcasting; or

(d) makes any reproduction of such sound

recording or visual recording where such initial recording was done without license or, where it was licensed, for any purpose not envisaged by such license; or

(e) sells or hires to the public or offers for such sale or hire, any such sound recording or visual recording referred to in clause (c) or clause (d), shall, subject to the provisions of section 39, be deemed to have infringed the broadcast reproduction right.”

It can be said that there was clear legislative intent to create separate rights for broadcasting and copyright cannot be claimed for the same. This can be further derived from Section 13 and 14 of the Copyright which does not cover Copyright. Court in ESPN case clearly of the view that there is a clear distinction between Copyright and Broadcasting Right and relevant portion of the case can be read as –

“19. Thus, in our view the above distinction clearly indicates that the Parliament clearly intended to provide separate and distinct rights to the broadcasting organisations to protect their rights against third parties. Satellite broadcasting rights are treated as separate rights and the said rights are recognized throughout the world as independent rights. This is also entirely in keeping with several radical technological advances in the field of telecommunications which could not have been contemplated when the 1957 Act was enacted.”

In the case of Raj Video vision v. M/s Sun TV, 1994 (2) Madras Law Weekly 158, court was of the view that “the Satellite television broadcasting right is an independent right for which the plaintiff cannot claim any copyright”. Though an independent copyright subsist in the work stored in the material form, and usually it is done in the form of a cinematographic film.

Saturday, August 27, 2011

"Aarakshan" - Ban imposed by UP Government and the take of Supreme Court on it

Much hyped movie “Aarakshan” has last been released throughout the country including Andhra Pradesh, UP and Punjab, states which had earlier imposed a ban on the movie in the light of maintaining law and order situation in the state. But, eventually they had to put the ban off. Andhra Pradesh and Punjab put the ban off on their own, while the ban was removed from the state UP following Supreme Court judgment in the case of M/S Prakash Jha Productions & Ors v. Union of India & Ors. The counsel for the petitioner was well known lawyer Mr. Harish Salve who handsomely convinced the court to remove the ban on the basis of its unconstitutionality. One of the reliefs which was sought by the petitioner was to strike down the provision mentioned therein under Section 6 (1) of the U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955. Another relief which was sought was to remove the ban from these three states as mentioned above. Court didn’t take into account the ban imposed in the state of Punjab and Andhra Pradesh because they had removed the ban at a later stage, which made petition against them infructuous.

Section 6 (1) of the U.P. Cinemas (Regulation) Act, 1955 states that -

“The State Government, in respect of the whole of the State of Uttar Pradesh or any part thereof,and the District Magistrate in respect of the district within his jurisdiction may, if it or he, as thecase may be, is of opinion that any film which is being publicly exhibited, is likely to cause a breach of the peace, by order, suspend the exhibition of the films and thereupon the films shall not during such suspension be exhibited in the State, part or the district concerned, notwithstandingthe certificate granted under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.”

From the wordings of the above act, it would not be difficult to conclude that a ban under this act can only be imposed once movie is exhibited publicly. In the instant case, no exhibition had taken place at the time when the ban was imposed over it which makes the act of the government ultra vires.

“A bare perusal of the aforesaid provision in Section 6 of the Act would make it crystal-clear that the power vested therein could be exercised by the State under the said provision when a filmwhich is being publicly exhibited could likely cause a breach of peace. Only in such circumstance and event, an order could be passed suspending the exhibition of the film.”

“The expression 'being publicly exhibited' and the word 'suspension' are relevant for our purpose and, therefore, we are giving emphasis on the aforesaid expression and the word. When it is said that a film is being publicly exhibited, it definitely pre- supposes a meaning that the film is being exhibited for public and in doing so if it is found to likely to cause breach of peace then in thatevent such a power could be exercised by the State Government. Such an extra-ordinary power cannot be exercised with regard to a film which is yet to be exhibited openly and publicly in aparticular State. This view that we have taken is also fortified from the use of the word 'suspension' in the said section. The word `suspension' envisages something functional or something which is being shown or is running. Suspension is always a temporary phase, which gets obliterated as and when the previous position is restored.”

Further, it had been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the impugned ban violated Fundamental Right mentioned therein under Article 19(1) of the Indian Constitution. Counsel on behalf of the state government contended that ban, if removed, would cause adverse effect on the law and order situation in the state. The movie was passed by the Central Board of Film Certification, and the same was viewed by an expert committee which included members of SC,ST and OBC communities and they had willingly certified the movie subject to the deletion of word “dalit” from the 1st part of the movie, and the movie was certified under the head “social”. Further court held that this committee has no power to impose pre-censorship once the movie had been passed by the board with an examining committee of the board. Despite this, the disputed word was removed by the producer voluntarily and thereafter it was released throughout the country. Counsel for the state argued that since the movie had been viewed by the expert committee, it can said to have been exhibited. But, court rejected this very argument on the ground that movie has to be publicly exhibited and this was not carried out in the present case. Further, the very fact that the movie had been released in all other state except UP and had been running smoothly refuted the arguments made by the counsel of the state government. It had been stated by the counsel that reservation is very sensitive issue and it would create adverse effect in the state. But, court was of the view that since the movie had been running smoothly in other areas of the country which are equally sensitive as that of UP, so UP cannot be made an exception. Further, court opined that reservation is also a social issue and discussion over it is quite an important thing to be done and state cannot impede this by means of an act. Moreover, once a movie has received certification from the CBFC board, it is the duty on the part of the state to impart its duty without hindering the release of the movie. A few case laws were discussed by the court during the course of hearing. First was S. Rangaranjan Vs. P. Jagjivan Ram & Ors. reported in (1989) 2 SCC 574,where it had been held by this court that –

“36. The democracy is a government by the people via open discussion. The democratic form ofgovernment itself demands its citizens an active and intelligent participation in the affairs of the community. The public discussion with people's participation is a basic feature and a rational process of democracy which distinguishes it from all other forms of government. The democracy can neither work nor prosper unless people go out to share their views. The truth is that publicdiscussion on issues relating to administration has positive value. What Walter Lippman said in another context is relevant here: When men act on the principle of intelligence, they go out to find the facts.... When they ignore it, they go inside themselves and find out what is there. Theyelaborate their prejudice instead of increasing their knowledge”

Secondly, court discussed the case of Union of India Vs. K.M. Shankarappa reported in (2001) 1 SCC 582, where it has been held by the court that –

“Once an expert body has considered the impact of the film on the public and has cleared the film,it is no excuse to say that there may be a law and order situation and that it is for the StateGovernment concerned to see that the law and order situation is maintained and that in any democratic society there are bound to be divergent views.”

Click here for the Supreme Court Judgment

Friday, August 12, 2011

Case Laws : Section 319 of Code of Criminal Procedure and Incorporation of New Person to the Trial

This article primarily aims to throw light on the recent decision delivered by the Supreme Court in the case of Sarojben Ashwinkumar Shah Etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors, where court laid down certain principles to make the procedure to be followed while applying Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which empowers a court to adjoin a person, though not being an accused while the suit was filed turns out to be a person who can be tried along with other accused. This particular case relates to the concept of partnership and the liability of the partners towards each other. Allowing the appeal, court laid down following guidelines to be applied while putting into consideration section 319 –

“(i) The Court can exercise the power conferred on it under Section 319 of the Code suo motu or on an application by someone.

(ii) The power conferred under Section 319(1) applies to all courts including the Sessions Court.

(iii) The phrase "any person not being the accused" occurring in Section 319 does not exclude from its operation an accused who has been released by the police under Section 169 of the Code and has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. In other words, the said expression covers any person who is not being tried already by the court and would include person or persons who have been dropped by the police during investigation but against whom evidence showing their involvement in the offence comes before the court.

(iv) The power to proceed against any person, not being the accused before the court, must be exercised only where there appears during inquiry or trial sufficient evidence indicaing his involvement in the offence as an accused and not otherwise. The word `evidence' in Section 319 contemplates the evidence of witnesses given in court in the inquiry or trial. The court cannot add persons as accused on the basis of materials available in the charge- sheet or the case diary but must be based on the evidence adduced before it. In other words, the court must be satisfied that a case for addition of persons as accused, not being the accused before it, has been made out on the additional evidence let in before it.

(v) The power conferred upon the court is although discretionary but is not to be exercised in a routine manner. In a sense, it is an extraordinary power which should be used very sparingly and only if evidence has come on record which sufficiently establishes that the other person has committed an offence. A mere doubt about involvement of the other person on the basis of the evidence let in before the court is not enough. The Court must also be satisfied that circumstances justify and warrant that other person be tried with the already arraigned accused.

(vi) The court while exercising its power under Section 319 of the Code must keep in view full conspectus of the case including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then.

(vii) Regard must also be had by the court to the constraints imposed in Section 319 (4) that proceedings in respect of newly - added persons shall be commenced afresh from the beginning of the trial.

(viii) The court must, therefore, appropriately consider the above aspects and then exercise its judicial discretion.”

Further case laws discussed by the court –

Joginder Singh and Another v. State of Punjab and Another, (1979) 1 SCC 345

“the power conferred under Section 319(1) of the Code is applicable to all courts including a Sessions Court and the Court has power to add any person, not being the accused before it, against whom there appears during trial sufficient evidence indicating his involvement in the offence, as an accused and direct him to be tried along with the other accused.”

Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi and Others, (1983) 1 SCC 1

"19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. More than this we would not like to say anything further at this stage. We leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court concerned so that it may act according to law. We would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed against respondents 2 to 5 will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it."

Michael Machado and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (2000) 3 SCC 262

"11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused.

12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words "the court may proceed against such person".

The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons.

14. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub-section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly-added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be recommenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action.

Shashikant Singh v. Tarkeshwar Singh and Another (2002) 5 SCC 738

"9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words "could be tried together with the accused" in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. "Could be" cannot under these circumstances be held to be "must be". The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the court."


Click Here for Full Judgment

Monday, August 8, 2011

Spes Successionis and Mohammedan Inheritance law

Personal laws, as generally considered, posses privilege as to their exclusion from the applicability of general laws governing India. Recently, one such issue had come before the Supreme Court in the case of Shenammal v. Hasan Khani Rawther and Ors. Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.7421-7422 of 2008 with Slp (C) Nos.14303-14304 of 2008, where a dispute relation to the property issue came before the court. The rule of estopel may not apply to inheritance in general sense, but it might be applied to certain situations, one such situation being in this particular case. The issues which had been resolved by the apex court in this case were –

(i) Whether a Deed of Relinquishment executed by an expectant heir could operate as estoppel to a claim that may be set up by the Executor of such Deed after inheritance opens on the death of the owner of the property?

(ii) Whether on execution of a Deed of Relinquishment after having received remuneration for such future share, the expectant heir could be estopped from claiming a share in the inheritance?

(iii) Can a Mohammedan by means of a Family Settlement relinquish his right of spes successionis when he had still not acquired a right in the property?

Section 6 (dd) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 states that a future in whatsoever manner secured or maintained cannot be transferred. In other words, it is a spes succesionis which literally means that that a person has a bare possibility of future interest cannot be transferred and the same is prohibited under this act by virtue of Section 6. But, it would also be necessary here to note that Section 2 of the same act provides that provisions pertaining to Transfer to Property Act would not be applicable to the Mohammedan Law. In the instant case, petitioner had been demanding the partition of the property left by her father irrespective of the fact, as alleged by the respondent, that she had already relinquished her right of claiming the property through a deed, and also by obtaining consideration for relinquishing such a deed.

Deceased, whose property is in dispute, left behind him three daughters and three sons who had a dispute among them as regards the partition of the land. It was alleged by the respondent 1 that all of his siblings had relinquished their share by the executing a deed in return of a consideration and they are not estopped from such deeds. Further, it was alleged by the respondent that his late father had orally executed a will in his favour as regards the whole of the land. On the other hand, it had been argued by the counsel of the petitioner that no expected right over the land can be relinquish and only those rights can be relinquished which had already been vested on the person. In this support, counsel for the petitioner relied on the case of Mt. Khannum Jan vs. Mt. Jan Bibi [(1827) 4 SDA 210] where it was held that renunciation implies the yielding up of a right already vested. Reference was also made to Ameer Ali's "Mohammedan Law", where this Court had in an earlier case observed that "renunciation implies the yielding up of a right already vested".

But, court placed reliance on the section 115 of the Indian Evidence Act which lays down the provision relation the estoppel and it had been clearly stated by the court that although Mohammedan law clearly stipulates that no transfer can be said to be a valid which has in fact been made by an heir who has a chance to succeed the property. Supreme Court had further previously held in Gulam Abbas Vs. Haji Kayyum Ali & Ors. [AIR 1973 SC 554] that the principle of an equitable estoppel far from being opposed to any principle of Mohammedan Law, is really in complete harmony with it. It had also held that

"under the Muslim Law an expectant heir may, nevertheless, be part of a course of conduct which may create an estoppel against claiming the right at a time when the right of inheritance has accrued"

It ultimately means that even though there is a concept of spes successionis, it would not be possible for a Muslim to claim his right over the property which he had relinquished by his own act, and is now estopped by virtue of Section115 of the Indian Evidence Act. Court in this case heavily relied on Paragraph 118 of Mulla's "Principles of Mahomedan Law", and with reference to this it was held by the court that

“The general principle that a Mohammedan cannot by Will dispose of more than a third of his estate after payment of funeral expenses and debts is capable of being avoided by the consent of all the heirs. In effect, the same also amounts to a right of relinquishment of future inheritance which is on the one hand forbidden and on the other accepted in the case of testamentary disposition. Having accepted the consideration for having relinquished a future claim or share in the estate of the deceased, it would be against public policy if such a claimant be allowed the benefit of the doctrine of spes successionis. In such cases, we have no doubt in our mind that the principle of estoppel would be attracted.”

Click here for the Full Judgment

Saturday, August 6, 2011

Tourist Vehicles are not allowed to carry luggage on the Roof

An interesting judgment has been delivered by the Supreme Court recently in Sharma Transport v. State of Maharashtra through a special leave where six appeals and three writ peitions were jointly taken up by the Court. The main issue in the petition was whether transporters are allowed to put up the luggage on the roof of a tourist vehicle. Court decided the issue with reference to the appeal filed by Sharma Transport. Reference had been made to Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 ( hereinafter “Rules”) along with Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. It was contended by the petitioner that they had a right to carry luggage of the passengers on the roof of the vehicle, and if not allowed to do so, their right under Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution would be violated. It was contended by the state that as it is clearly mentioned in t Rule 128 (9) of Central Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 that the transporters should provide space for the luggage of the passengers at the rear and the sides of the vehicle, and prohibits carrying the luggage on the roof of the vehicle. Petition filed by the appellant was rejected by the Bombay High Court primarily on the ground that:

“We are not accepting the submission of the petitioner that in the absence of a specific restriction in regard to having luggage holds/carrier on the roof of the vehicle the petitioners cannot be prevented from carrying the goods/luggage on the roof of the vehicle. On the contrary we are of the clear view that luggage has to be stored at the places specifically permitted by sub rule 9(i) viz., at the rear or at sides or both, but not the roof of the vehicle.”

It was contended by the learned counsel for the state that carrying luggage on the roof of a tourist vehicles increases the chances of accident, and which consequently lead to the danger which passengers have to bear. A specific limit on the luggage to be carried by the passengers has been provided under the Rules, and transporters are legally bound to follow such limit. Section 2 (43) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 defines the meaning of the expression `tourist vehicle' to mean a contract carriage, constructed or adapted and equipped and maintained in accordance with such specifications as may be prescribed in this behalf. Counsel for the appellant argued by relying on the Rule 93 of the Rules and thereby incorporating it with Rule 128 (9) which mentions the places where luggage are to be kept in. But, their contention was evidently rejected by the court principally on the ground that that rule specified “tractors/articulated vehicle” and it cannot in any manner be related to the tourist vehicle, which was in dispute in the present case. Rule 128(9) of the Rules states

(9) Luggage.--(i) Luggage holds shall be provided at the rear or at the sides, or both, of the tourist vehicle with sufficient space and size, and shall be rattle proof, dustproof and waterproof with safety arrangements;

Supreme Court dismissed the appeal while pronouncing that –

Rule 128 (9) is a special provision meant for laying down specifications for a tourist vehicle. The sub-Rule specifically provides that in a tourist vehicle, the permit holder should only provide luggage holds at the rear or at the sides or both, of the tourist vehicle with sufficient space and size. When the Rules specifically make a provision in regard to the place where luggage holds shall be provided by necessary implication, it goes to exclude all the other places of the tourist vehicle for being used as luggage holds. In our view, since the language of the Rule is clear and unambiguous, no other construction need be resorted to understand the plain language of the sub-Rule (a) of Rule 128 of the Rules. Rule 128 is a special provision for tourist vehicles which excludes General Rule 93 to the extent of conflict between the former and the later.

In addition to this, certain case laws had been discussed by the Court to make it clear and unambiguous that when the plain and simple reading of a statue is able to signify the intention of the legislature, then there is no need to make it more complicated by resorting to assumptions which are not required.

Case Laws on the Interpretation of Statues –

In this case – Sharma Transport v. State of Maharashtra

The cardinal rule of interpretation is to allow the general words to take their natural wide meaning unless the language of the Statute gives a different indication of such meaning and is likely to lead to absurd result, in which case their meaning can be restricted by the application of this rule and they may be required to fall in line with the specific things designated by the preceding words. When the language used in the statute is clear and unambiguous, it is the duty of the court to give effect to it.”

Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay, (2002) 4 SCC 297

“10. No words or expressions used in any statute can be said to be redundant or superfluous. In matters of interpretation one should not concentrate too much on one word and pay too little attention to other words. No provision in the statute and no word in any section can be construed in isolation. Every provision and every word must be looked at generally and in the context in which it is used. It is said that every statute is an edict of the legislature. The elementary principle of interpreting any word while considering a statute is to gather the mens or sententia legis of the legislature. Where the words are clear and there is no obscurity, and there is no ambiguity and the intention of the legislature is clearly conveyed, there is no scope for the court to take upon itself the task of amending or alternating the statutory provisions. Wherever the language is clear the intention of the legislature is to be gathered from the language used. While doing so, what has been said in the statute as also what has not been said has to be noted. The construction which requires for its support addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words has to be avoided...”

Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd., (2003) 2 SCC 111

“24. True meaning of a provision of law has to be determined on the basis of what it provides by its clear language, with due regard to the scheme of law.

25. Scope of the legislation on the intention of the legislature cannot be enlarged when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous. In other words statutory enactments must ordinarily be construed according to its plain meaning and no words shall be added, altered or modified unless it is plainly necessary to do so to prevent a provision from being unintelligible, absurd, unreasonable, unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the rest of the statute.”

Harshad S. Mehta v. State of Maharashtra,(2001) 8 SCC 257

“34. There is no doubt that if the words are plain and simple and call for only one construction, that construction is to be adopted whatever be its effect...”

Union of India v. Hansoli Devi, (2002) 7 SCC 273

“9...It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the court must give effect to the words used in the statute and it would not be open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act...”

Patangrao Kadam v. Prithviraj Sayajirao Yadav Deshmukh,(2001) 3 SCC 594

“12. Thus when there is an ambiguity in terms of a provision, one must look at well-settled principles of construction but it is not open to first create an ambiguity which does not exist and then try to resolve the same by taking recourse to some general principle.”